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The Six-Party Talks has yet to resume since 2008. Each and every party was yet 
to share the view to reconcile the divergence. Differences in stakes and interests 
deem to be the main impediment in crafting the peaceful resolution on the 
Peninsula. Impartiality is therefore a key to approach the Six-Party Talks, in 
particular, and the Korean Peninsula, at large. It has been missing on the 
deliberation. The emerging role of the Middle Power offers a promising 
alternative to help resuscitate the stalemate. With its impartiality, Middle Power 
could assert its Third-Party and mediating role on the Talks. Through 
Hopmann’s four-pronged approach, Indonesia, as among the prominent middle 
power, may give a new hope to the Peninsula constellation. 
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I. The Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula 
The Korean War that took place back in 1950-1953 has yet ended. The 
1953 Armistice Agreement between the Republic of Korea (ROK), which 
was represented by the United Nations Command (UNC) 1 , and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) entails potential 
conflicts in the region. The political collapse in Pyongyang, not to 
mention the North Korean nuclear weapon advancement, compounds the 
Peninsula’s security problem. This, indeed, has put the Peninsula, in 
particular, and the global theater, at large, at stake.  
Korea had been an object of regional power competition for quite 
some time (Conroy, 1960). During the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Korea became the object of competing imperial interests as the Chinese 
empire declined and Western powers began to vie for ascendancy in East 
Asia.2 Britain, France, and the United States each attempted to “open up” 
                                                        
1 President Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the first president of the Republic of Korea, and his government had 
handed over the operational control of the South Korean armed forces to the UN 
commander, where the South Korean forces were under the UN Command during the 
Korean War (known as the Taejŏn Agreement or Taejŏn Declaration) (Taegyoon, 2008). 
2 Retrieved from “Korean History and Political Geography”, 
http://asiasociety.org/education/korean-history-and-political-geography (visited on 




Korea to trade and diplomatic relations in the 1860s despite some 
resistances from the Korean kingdom.3 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Japan, China and Russia 
were competing for earning influence on Korea. After gaining victory in 
the first Sino-Japanese war and Russo-Japanese war in 1895 and 1905, 
respectively, Japan turned to be a predominant power on the Korean 
Peninsula until the Enola Gay dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima and The Bockscar dropped the Fat Man atomic bomb on 
Nagasaki back in August 1945. 
After the Japanese surrender in the World War II, the dark clouds 
started to gather over the Korean Peninsula. The division of the Peninsula 
into two separate states; the Republic of Korea (South of the 38th Parallel), 
“backed” by the US (and its allies), and the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (North of the Parallel), backed by the USSR and the People’s 
Republic of China, had further complicated the regional configuration. 
The perpetual peace in the Peninsula is therefore far-fetched. These 
mammoths had put the Korea as a buffer zone between the Communist 
Bloc and the Capitalist Bloc during the Cold War period. 
The inception of the nuclear program in the Peninsula had further 
escalated the tension. Back in the year 1960, the DPRK started developing 
its first nuclear program. Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, located in the 
county of Nyŏngbyŏn in North Pyong'an Province, about 90 km north of 
Pyongyang, was its first nuclear plant which was the outcome of the 
nuclear research agreement between the DPRK and the USSR back in the 





early 1959. Experts believe that the reactor could make one bomb's worth 
of plutonium per year.4 
There are a few doubts that from the earliest stages, North Korea’s 
elite were interested in the military applications of their nuclear program. 
But it seems that the decisive turn occurred in the 1970s.5 At that time, 
South Korea was also developing its own nuclear weapons, which came 
quite close to success. 6  Therefore, it ignited the North to boost their 
military nuclear program around 1975. 
North Korean leaders essentially had two main goals in mind when 
promoting their nuclear program (Lankov, 2015).7 First and foremost, it 
serves military purposes. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and, 
with a credible nuclear potential, North Korea is unlikely to be attacked 
by any foreign power. 8  The Iraq and Libya cases were among the 
reinforcing factors of the DPRK leaders to develop their nuclear program. 
“Nuclear Diplomacy” would serve the second rationale behind the nuclear 
weapon development program of the DPRK. Lankov argued that the 
nuclear weapon is “an efficient tool for diplomatic blackmail”.  
Quite recently, the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test which drew 
wide condemnation. Until today, the United Nations Security Council 
                                                        
4 Retrieved from “N Korea's Yongbyon plutonium site likely reactivated says IAEA”, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36466247 (visited on July 21, 2016) 
5 Lankov, Andrei, “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia”, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 181-182 
6 Oberdorfer, Don, “The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History” (New York: Basic Books, 
2001), 68-74.  
7 Lankov, Andrei, “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia”, 





(UNSC) had adopted five major resolutions since 2006. They “impose and 
strengthen sanctions on North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear 
weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program 
‘in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner (CVID)’ and refrain 
from ballistic missile tests.”9 These international political and economic 
sanctions have put the North Korean regime in deeper isolation as well as 
the people in rampant starvation. However, the sanctions are yet to be 
efficacious in urging the regime to give up their nuclear weapons. 
II. Repeated Attempts to Establish Security Dialogues 
on the Peninsula 
The DPRK nuclear development program has, indeed, drawn wide-
ranging attention. A number of platforms, including bilateral, regional as 
well as multilateral, have been established to address the issue. Beginning 
in the first North Korean nuclear crisis, (direct) bilateral channel between 
the US and the DPRK was opted for as a vehicle to address the nuclear 
issue. This in turn led to the inception of the 1994 Geneva Agreed 
Framework on which the DPRK agreed to dismantle the nuclear program. 
It was, however, disrupted after Pyongyang-Washington confrontations on 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) over suspected North Korean violations 
of the framework agreement.  
Multilateralism was later put forward after the first Korean Nuclear 
Crisis. Choo opined that it was buttressed by the political shift in the 
                                                        
9 Retrieved from “The UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea”, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-




Chinese side. 10  The destructive nature of the crisis which could pose 
significant threat to the Chinese growth and development pushed Beijing 
to engage Third Party in addressing the issue (Carlin and Lewis, 2008). 
Prior to that, Beijing seemed reluctant to bring the North Korean issue to 
the regional as well as multilateral platform.  They define the crisis as 
“must be handled by the immediately concerned parties (dangshizhe 
yuanzi)”.11 
On April 1996, Presidents Clinton of the USA and Kim Young-sam of 
ROK proposed the creation of the Four-Party Talks with the PRC and the 
DPRK. This platform explored ways to replace the Korean Armistice with 
a permanent deal without “deadlines or preconditions”.12 However, the 
Four-Party Talks could not sustain for the two camps proposed opposite 
agendas for the talks. Washington and Seoul put forward the need to 
discuss and implement confidence building and tensions reducing 
measures while Pyongyang proposed such painstaking issues as “the US 
withdrawal from South Korea as well as a US-DPRK peace treaty”13. 
A few years later, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
(TCOG) was launched as a means of institutionalizing the process of 
consultation and policy coordination on North Korean Affairs. Apart from 
a reflection of the US’s “hub and spokes” arrangement, the TCOG, which 
                                                        
10 Choo, Jaewoo, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talk Possible?”, (Springer 
Netherlands: 2005), East Asia December 2005, Volume 22, Issue 4 
11 Ibid.  
12 Retrieved from “North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks”, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/01/world/north-korea-agrees-to-join-4-party-
talks.html (visited on August 27, 2016). 
13 Lee, Inbae, “A Study on Multilateral Approaches to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear 




was a triangular relationship between the US, South Korea and Japan, was 
critical in expressly “devising a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
North Korea”. 14   The greatest utility of the TCOG was its role of 
reinforcing solidarity among the three countries and simultaneously 
consolidating policy approaches between the two-way relationships within 
the trilateral coordination framework.15 
Another effort made was the establishment of the Five-Party Talks, 
which was originated from the so-called “P5 plus 5” (i.e. the United 
Nations Security Council Permanent Five plus the Republic of Korea, 
Japan, Australia, the European Union and the DPRK) meeting back in 
January 2003. The proposal was rejected by Pyongyang which continued 
to request direct DPRK-US bilateral talks through the US-DPRK “New 
York channel”16. The then Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister Qian 
Qichen of PRC later proposed “Three-Party Talks” during his visit to 
Pyongyang in 2003. The platform was then dissolved after Washington 
refused to have (direct) bilateral contacts with Pyongyang. 
After series and rounds of failed attempts and negotiations, ‘Six-Party 
Talks for Solving the North Korean Nuclear Problem’ (in short, ‘Six-Party 
Talks’) was established in 2003. Having DPRK, Japan, PRC, Russian 
Federation, USA and ROK on board, the Six-Party Talks deemed to be a 
                                                        
14 Kang,  Stephanie Nayoung, GSIS, 2013, “The Incomplete Journey of US-ROK-Japan 
Trilateral Cooperation: The Establishment and Dissolution of the Trilateral Coordination 
and Oversight Group (TCOG)” 
15 Ibid. 
16 The New York channel originally referred to business-like communications between the 
US Department of State’s Director of Korean Affairs and the DPRK’s Deputy Permanent 
Representative at its UN Mission in New York. This channel was later upgraded and 
involved the passage of government communications between the DPRK’s UN 




promising platform to address the DPRK nuclear program. The inclusion 
of relevant stakeholders as well as the DPRK, as the “Target State”, in the 
platform entails positive-sum solutions to the long-standing North Korean 
nuclear issue. However, after five-year negotiations, it reached a 
momentum where the stark divergences were yet to be reconciled.  
III. Impartial Rapprochement to Foster the Six-Party 
Talks 
The divergent perspectives and expectations have impeded the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategy and the formation of a 
permanent security regime on the Peninsula (MacQueen, 2008). Each and 
every party in the Talks pursues their own interests and agendas. It is 
further deteriorated with domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, 
and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries which 
later have brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral 
negotiating table (Park, 2005). 
Mutual distrust, insecurity, and hidden agendas often prevent 
countries from resolving disputes despite prolonged efforts and sacrifices. 
Thus, at a certain point, one must consider the possibility of involving 
additional parties in order to maneuver intractable conflicts beyond the 
parochialisms that have hindered development in the past.17 Therefore, it 
is, to some extent, rational should the DPRK asked the Norwegian 
government, as an alternative power, to take participation in the Six-Party 
                                                        
17 MacQueen, Simon. 2008. Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security 




Talks back in the year 2006, despite the disapproval of Norwegian 
government upon the request.18 
This so-called Third Party involvement, which, to some extent, 
envisaged ‘neutral’ as well as ‘impartial’ view, has a long and deep root in 
the Korean Peninsula history. Dated back to the Korean War in the period 
of 1951-1953, the two Koreans, as appeared in the Korean Armistice 
Agreement, recognized Sweden and Switzerland (from the UN Command 
side) and Poland and Czhechoslovakia (from the Supreme Commander of 
the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s 
Volunteers) as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 19  The 
Commission was established with the purpose to, among other things, 
“carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and 
investigation and to report the results of such supervision, observation, 
inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission”.20  
Despite having a deep-rooted history, impartiality deems to be the 
missing link on the resolution of the DPRK nuclear program thus far. 
Each and every party put forward their vested interests to the table.  
Against such a backdrop, it necessitates to find “impartial” party(ies) to 
unlock the (political) impasses of the Talks. ‘Middle Power’ countries are 
well positioned to act as informal mediators and facilitate a smooth 
                                                        
18 Retrieved from Reuters. 17 March 2006, “DPRK Asks Norway to Broker Nuclear Deal” 
19 “Neutral nation is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not 
participated in the hostilities in Korea” (under Chapter C “Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Comission”, Sub-Chapter 1 Composition, Article 37 of the Agreement between the 
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Vommand, on the one hand, and the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea). 




transition between the DPRK and the international community of ‘friendly 
nations’.21 
Middle Powers are often in a suitable position for promoting and 
maintaining mechanism for security.  They enjoy robust relations with 
great powers whilst at the same time Middle Powers are very unlikely to 
confront smaller nations, either in military, economy or politics. In short, 
middle powers have a reputation for (relative) neutrality. 
IV. Research Questions 
Against such a backdrop, this thesis attempts to explore alternative 
approach to help restart the stalemate of the Six-Party Talks which is 
navigated through the following research questions: 
1. Why do Middle-Tier Countries (i.e. Indonesia) deem to be able to 
play a constructive role in resolving the Six-Party Talk stalemate 
which later could lead or develop as well as find mutually-beneficial 
resolutions of the DPRK nuclear program despite the Six-Party Talk 
member states’ unrelenting efforts in solving the matter thus far? 
2. How could the Middle-Tier Countries (i.e. Indonesia) navigate the 
muddy-water of the Six-Party Talks without infringing the lowest-
common denomination of each party concerned? 
                                                        
21 MacQueen, Simon. 2008. Middle Powers and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security 





The paper holds on to a premise, which is discussed in the following 
chapter, that different agendas pursued by each and every member of the 
Six-Party Process (actor’s approach) is the main impediment in attaining 
the collective goals to denuclearize the Peninsula. All the parties pursue 
their own interests which later led to the political deadlock. Impartiality is, 
therefore, a key in asserting alternative approach in garnering collective 
political will to restart the Talks. 
The aforementioned impartiality could not be found in the members of 
the Talks. They pursue their own interests on the Talks. The emergence of 
Middle Power role in the regional as well as global architecture is seen as 
an alternative platform in addressing the loophole. Impartiality is among 
the major modalities that the Middle Power diplomacy proposes. Such 
element would be the key in fostering the Talks with the goals to create 
the region conducive, through denuclearization of the DPRK. 
Indonesia deems to be the most potential candidate in exerting its role 
to help resume the Talks. “Non-alignment” and “activism” Foreign Policy 
serves among utmost modalities that put Indonesia in a relatively best 
leverage. This paper is therefore to explore Indonesia’s constructive role 
to help resuscitate the Six-Party Talks. In so doing, the paper is to make 
use of P. Terrence Hopmann’s roles of Third-Party in the international 




communication, compromise and convergence; (iii) facilitator of 
cognitive change; (iv) formulator; and (v) manipulator22. 
The paper puts more weights on the first four roles of the Hopmann’s 
concept. The fifth Manipulator role, as Hopmann argued, works best only 
for powerful as well as partisan mediators. It is clear to argue that 
Indonesia does not fall under strong power but Middle Power group. In 
addition, as among the most potential candidate of the Third-Party on the 
Six-Party Talks, Indonesia is relatively impartial in asserting its role. 
Therefore, the fifth role of Hopmann’s Third-Party concept does not fit to 















                                                        
22 Hopmann, P. Terrence, “The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International 






I. Six-Party Talks and Its Challenges  
September 9th 2016 has reminded us that the world is facing a real threat. 
The DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test which many experts believe as 
the strongest and most advanced one. Many predicted that the DPRK is to 
gain its capability in developing the cutting-edge nuclear weapon within a 
very foreseeable future. 
Nuclear proliferation in the Peninsula has gained significant weight in 
posing substantial threat to the global peace and stability. Repeated attempts 
had been made to mitigate this very issue. Despite its stalemate due to 
verification protocol in December 2008, Six-Party Talks, as many experts 
argue, remain the most plausible channel in resolving the nuclear 
proliferation in the Peninsula peacefully.  
The potential of the Talks in resolving the DPRK denuclearization has 
drawn wide-ranging attention. A rich body of literature, not to mention 
policy papers, has discussed the issue attentively. Tae-Hwan Kwak, the 
Chair-Professor at South Korean Kyungnam University, among many 
scholars and experts, goes with the argument that Six-Party Talks (SPT) is 
“the best means to resolve the North Korea’s nuclear issue”.23 Not only 
involving relevant stakeholders, SPT also set a roadmap to the 
                                                        
23 Kwak, Tae-Hwan, “The Six-Party Talks and North Korea’s Denuclearization: Evaluation and 
Prospects”, Pacific Focus, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (August 2010), 211–236, 2010 Center for 




denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as provided commitment-
and-commitment-and-action-for-action steps towards implementing the 
roadmap in phased manner, which in turn spurred optimism among the 
parties concerned on the prospects of the North Korea denuclearization. 
Similar notion was also emphasized by Scott Synder. He envisioned the 
2005 Joint Statement as the raison d’etre of the (continuation) the Six-Party 
Talks. He believes that SPT signals a continued commitment by all 
concerned parties to, among other goals, the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, normalization of the bilateral relations among the SPT member 
states, economic development and peace and stability maintenance in the 
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.24 
Despite such potential roles, Six-Party process has yet resuscitated since 
2008. The collective idea to attain regional and global peace and stability 
through denuclearizing the DPRK is therefore at stake. Along this line, a 
number of scholars discussed the SPT challenges in attaining its collective 
goals which this paper classifies into two major approaches, namely 
institutions (regime theory) and actors view. 
A. Institutions Approach 
Among many “school of thoughts” which envisages the SPT challenges 
is the institutionalism. Sangtu Ko, Professor at the Graduate School for 
Area Studies of Yonsei University, South Korea, is one of many 
prominent scholars who microscopes the failure of the SPT from the 
                                                        
24 Synder, Scott, “North Korea’s Nuclera and Missile Tests and Six-Party Talks: Where Do We 
Go From Here?”, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global 




institutionalism point of view. In his piece of work titled “The North 
Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime 
Failure”, he focuses on three bottlenecking elements which impede the 
development of the Six-Party Process, namely asymmetrical information, 
narrow incentives and (limited) sanctions. 
With respect to asymmetrical information, Ko underlined that “the 
distribution of information was structurally obstructed by the division of 
the participating countries into two groups: the US, Japan, and South 
Korea; and China, Russia, and North Korea.”25 Despite each trilateral 
group worked in concert, Ko further argues that this served as an 
obstacle to the distribution of unbiased information. 
Ko also analyzed the problem of incentives in the Six-Party Talks 
“lies in the unequal readiness to shoulder the burden of providing 
incentives to North Korea.”26 South Korea and Japan pledged to provide 
food and energy incentives, while the US offered security assurances 
and release from trade restrictions. This difference comes from 
divergent solutions the parties have pursued in dealing with North 
Korea.27 South Korea preferred a Ukrainian model and was ready to 
provide large-scale financial assistance, whereas the US insisted on a 
                                                        
25 Ko, Sangtu, “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime 






Libyan case approach and just promised to help North Korea integrate 
into the international community.28 
Sanctions, as Ko argued, are regarded as critical to the viability of 
the Six-Party Talks. However, there was a wide divergence among 
parties concerning the issue of sanctions.29 The US government adopted 
the toughest sanctions towards the DPRK. According to a 2016 report 
by Office of Foreign Assets Control, the US government adopted multi-
faceted sanctions program towards the DPRK since 2008. In the 
meantime, the Chinese side displayed some reservations to lay tougher 
sanctions upon the DPRK. Regime collapse was among substantial 
backgrounds for the Chinese side to call on for tougher sanctions. South 
Korea eagerly wanted to prevent the nuclear development program but 
was opposed to any military option. 30  It pursued at best regime 
transformation through an opening and reform policy in the North.31 
However, the other member states did not buy these ideas. 
B. Actors Approach 
The main rationale behind the establishment of the Six-Party Talks is 
the collective aspiration shared by the US, Japan, ROK, China and 
Russia on the denuclearization of the DPRK. The DPRK nuclear 
technology has been regarded as a substantial challenge to the regional 
and global peace and stability. Therefore, there was a collective need to 
                                                        
28 John Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
No. 4, 2005, p. 79 
29 Ko, Sangtu, “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime 






address the issue peacefully and constructively. However, in reaching 
the mentioned ultimate goal, each and every party pursued different 
interests which then have put the negotiations in stalemate since 2008, 
as the theory calls “Actor’s approach”, which the paper holds on to. 
Since the 1990s, “verifiable denuclearization” has been the 
catchword of Washington’s successive administrations (Chung, 2013). 
Washington remains steadfast in putting forward the DPRK 
denuclearization as its top priority until today. Complete, Verifiable and 
Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) of the DPRK is of the US 
“lowest-common-denomination” that has been “rejuvenated” by the 
2005 Agreement. In addition, human rights violation and lack of 
attention on economic and welfare in spite of its simultaneous pursuit of 
nuclear development are, at the same time, echoed by the US delegation 
on the Six-Party Talks. The UN’s findings on “several alleged violations, 
including those concerning the right to food and those associated with 
prison camps; torture and inhuman treatment; arbitrary detention; 
discrimination; freedom of expression, movement and religion; the right 
to life; and enforced disappearances, including abductions of nationals 
to other countries”32 have further fueled the US to urge the DPRK to 
embrace “Open Door” policy which entails democratization and 
economic revitalization. 
                                                        
32 Retrieved from “Unspeakable Atrocities” Reported by the UN Inquiry into the Human Rights 






As a traditional ally of the US, in the meantime, the ROK shares 
similar stance on the issue of the DPRK nuclear disarmament, not to 
mention their long-aspired peaceful unification as well as better Inter-
Korean relations (i.e. economic exchange and cooperation) with hopes 
of resolving the continuous direct and omnipresent (military threat from 
its Northern neighbor since the year 1945. For the last two 
administrations, notably Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hyee, Seoul 
continuously demanded Pyongyang to abandon their nuclear program. 
Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, for instance, Seoul strongly 
urged Pyongyang through the “Denuclearization, Openness, 3000” 
policy which implied that Seoul would assist Pyongyang to achieve 
$3,000 GDP per capita, once Pyongyang denuclearized and opened up.33 
In the current Park Geun-hyee administration, in addition, the ROK has 
been recorded to demand the North to show its “sincerity” in the 
negotiation table by living up to its international obligations and 
previous agreements to give up its nuclear weapons and development 
program under the so-called Trustpolitik which underlines the principles 
of trust, pursuing peace and joint prosperity in the Korean Peninsula 
while cooperating with the international community. 34  However, 
coordination with ally and building trust across a divided nation has 
proven to be difficult. 
                                                        
33 Eun-sook, Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Positions 
of Countries Involved”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2013, 1–
15 
34 “North Korea has Nothing to Gain from Nuclear Weapons and Missiles”, News Zone, 




Rozman, in the meantime, argues that Japanese government pursues 
three different goals in the DPRK/nuclear negotiations, not to mention 
abduction issue as a domestic politics stake. First and foremost, it is to 
soften the Korean position on its historical occupation. 35  Japan and 
South Korea are at odds on the issue of colonial era. Against this, Tokyo 
“makes use” Pyongyang issue to lower the temper on the matter. The 
Japanese government, as the Rozman further argues, is to become a 
political power that could shape the development of relations between 
the South and North, since vital security interests were at stake and the 
United States could not be trusted to share them. 36  Lastly, regional 
power rivalry fuels Japan to assert its role in the denuclearization talks. 
It is of Japanese aspiration to be able to deal with China and Russia 
independently of the US. The isolated North gave Japan its 
opportunity.37 
Unlike the US and its allies, China attached greater emphasis on the 
peace and stability in the Peninsula and the Northeast Asia. China’s 
aspiration to be a global player, which is of a pivotal element in 
actualizing the Chinese dream, deems to be the rationale behind the 
China’s less-pressure and “benign” policy Viz-à-Viz the DPRK. Beijing 
would rather go for consultation and dialogue than laying upon stricter 
economic sanctions, which would, to Beijing’s concern, pose a 
challenge to the “equilibrium” and stability in Pyongyang (i.e. regime 
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collapse which would lead to the US’ and the ROK’s control over 
Peninsula as well as bring hordes of refugees over the China’s area). 
Such “soft-power” approach seems to be the Beijing’s top priority in 
better ensuring the peace and stability in the Peninsula, in particular, and 
the North East Asia, at large, where their main interests lie. An 
observation by Dong-ryul Lee could better explain the aforementioned 
Beijing’s aspiration. He argued the gap between China’s long-term goal 
to be a global power and microscopic viewpoint in addressing the 
nuclear issue has led it to seek diplomatic, multilateral means to address 
the nuclear issue (reference to the Six-Party Talks framework, adoption 
of sanctions, persuasion, conciliation, pressure) while it also eventually 
wants a DRPK regime that is a friendly to itself, used as a strategic 
buffer and increased influence over Korean Peninsula among the powers 
in the Northeast Asian region.38 
Among the four major powers, Russia has the weakest links to the 
Korean peninsula and East Asia in every sense—political, economic, 
and cultural.39 Against this, SPT serves an avenue for Russia to gain 
their foothold in the region. In political aspect, the Russian views SPT 
as a means to hinder the US hegemony in the world as well as China’s 
importance in East Asia, as in creating a multi-polar world (Toloraya, 
2008). Moscow is to earn equal footing with the US, China and Japan 
on the issue of North Korea denuclearization. On the economic sphere, 
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Moscow set their goal in better integrating with the East Asia. Moscow 
expected South Korea to become an important customer of Russian oil, 
gas and other raw materials from Siberia (Trans-Siberian Railroad), 
which could even function as a springboard to other Asian markets like 
Japan.40 Failure to move forward on the Korean issues, if it leads to war 
or the stagnation of regional economic development, threatens Russia’s 
domestic development program for the RFE (Russian Far East) (Kim 
and Blank, 2010) 
As the so-called “Target State”, the DPRK plays a key role in the 
deliberation of the Six-Party Talks. Their “alleged” nuclear weapon 
serves as the trump card for the regime to whether embrace the 
perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula by living up to the 
international aspiration or turn the Peninsula to a “battlefield” by turning 
down the negotiation. Yet, the DPRK’s tacit bargaining strategy attested 
a thorny road to achieve the former outcome. American security 
assurances (i.e. non-aggression pact), permanent peace treaty, 
normalization of bilateral relationship and nuclear-weapon-state 
recognition are among key stakes that the DPRK attempted to pursue in 
return for the nuclear disarmament. Iraq and Libya are among 
significant lessons-learnt for the DPRK regime to seek for the formal 
US security guarantee as the pretext of the future denuclearization. 
Bilateral normalization, on the other hand, deems to be of significance 
for Pyongyang to thrive. The US and Japan are among major 
stakeholders that place economic as well as political significance for the 
DPRK long-standing existence. 





Different stakes have impeded the deliberation of the SPT process. 
Each and every party keeps holding onto their “common denomination” 
in the negotiation table. The US sticks with their “verifiable 
denuclearization”. Whilst China and Russia buttressed the security 
guarantees and economic assistances towards the DPRK with the 
purpose of avoiding the regime collapse. However, bearing in mind the 
current geo-strategic rivalry among the stakeholders, including the US-
China, China-Japan as well as China-Japan-Russia-South Korea on 
territorial disputes, reconciling the diverging interests would be a key in 
reaching the perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula. 
II. Alternative Rapprochement to Resume the Talks 
Partiality highly colors Six-Party Talks process. Each and every party 
pursues their vested interests through the platform. This common 
phenomenon turned to be the otherwise when there is no consensus to 
accommodate the differences. The current fifth DPRK nuclear test of 
October 2016 shall be the reminder on the importance of reconciling the 
divergence towards achieving the long-awaited collective goal—peace and 
stability in the Peninsula. 
Since 2008, concerned parties have not done nothing to pursue their 
collective agenda. Yet, it did not turn out as expected. The lowest common 
denomination (read: partiality) deems to be the major stumbling block for 
the advancement of the Talks. With this in mind, the Process necessitates 
alternative approach. One that fulfills and satisfies all concerned parties’ 





A. Middle Power 
Middle Power has been gaining significance for the last decade or so. 
They play a unique role in the globally geo-strategic multipolar 
architecture. The concept of the ‘middle power’ itself dates back to the 
late 16th century, when Italian Renaissance philosopher, Giovanni 
Botero, divided the world into three types of states—grandissime 
(empires), mezano (middle powers), and piccioli (small powers).41  
Despite no general consensus on the definition and typology of 
Middle Powers, voluminous literatures have discussed this emerging 
issue. Not the least, a number of prominent scholars devote themselves 
to explore as well as elaborate (the role of) middle power (see inter alia: 
Beeson, 2011; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Cooper, 1997; Cotton, 
and Ravenhill, 2012; Cox, 1989; Efstathopoulos, 2011; Gilley, 2011; 
Holbraad, 1984; Holmes, 1966; Jordan, 2003; King-Gordon, 1966; 
Manicom and O’Neil, 2012; Nossal and Stubbs, 1997; Ping, 2005; Pratt, 
1990; Ravenhill, 1998; Rutherford, 2010; Soeya, 2012; Stairs, 1998; 
Van Der Westenhuizen, 1998; Ungerer, 2007; Wood, 1988).  
Various approaches are coined to theorize about middle powers. 
Richard Higgott, Vice Chancellor and President Murdoch University, 
Western Australia, approach Middle Powers through four basic 
approaches, namely (i) Realist-Positionalist, (ii) Normative/Identity-
driven, (iii) Behavioral and (iv) ‘Systematic Impact’ approach. Realist-
Positional approach prioritizes protection of core interests (Holbraad, 
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1984). The Normative and behavioral approaches emphasizes the values 
of what the states ought to do and how they do, respectively (Cranford 
Pratt et al. 1990, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993). Whilst the 
systemic impact emphasizes on the impact made by the middle powers 
(Carr, 2013). 
In the meantime, prominent international relations theories, namely 
realism, liberalism and constructivism, also approach middle powers 
based on their own criteria. Realists utilize material status, such as 
military and economic capability as well as population size, to explain 
the category of middle powers, as not as high of those of superpowers 
but also not as low as those of the small ones (Holbraad, 1984). From a 
liberal-institutionalist perspective, middle powers are good 
multilateralists or good global citizens who respect international values, 
seek to improve trading networks, and enhance communications to 
promote understanding as well as prefer multilateral ways of solving 
conflicts to unilateral ones,42 or so-called ‘Middlepowermanship’. From 
a Constructivist or neo-Kantian approach of understanding states, the 
middlepowermanship is highly related to their behaviors and 
statecrafts. 43  According to Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined 
Communities”, states are formed around a dynamic mix of ‘genuine, 
popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, 
instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the 
educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth’ (Anderson, 
1991). Therefore, Middlepowermanship status is also what a state 
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imagines of itself, which is originated from ideas, such as goals, threats, 
fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence 
states and non-state actors within the international system. 44 
B. Middle Power Diplomacy 
According to Cooper et al., the rise of the middle power activism since 
the late 1980s can be attributed to; (i) the decline of American resources 
in responding to greater vulnerabilities, especially in the international 
economic system; (ii) change from security related, high policy issues in 
the Cold War era to economic security and social concerns of 
environment and human rights; and (iii) the role of domestic politics on 
foreign policy.45 
Ever since, Middle Powers play an increasing role in the regional as 
well as global configurations. A number of prominent scholars 
identified Middle Power’s roles in their large volume of works. Beeson 
and Higgott, for instance, looked at middle power not as a giant but a 
good dancer. They are also very skilled in persuasion, coalition building 
and ‘the art of the indirect’. They play the role as (i) catalyst, (ii) 
facilitator and (iii) manager.46 
As catalyst, the middle power provides stimulus and energy to staled 
and frustrated negotiations. Clear and innovative intellectual 
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contributions from different perspectives have shown to be beneficial to 
the resolution of protracted conflicts. 47  As facilitators, they could 
develop agendas, set priorities, cement coalitions and plan and arrange 
meetings. In addition, as a manager, they build institutions, develop 
monitoring systems and create liaisons and other systems for increasing 
confidence (Dunk and McKay, 1997). 
Keohane, writing in 1969, echoed similar approach to that of Beeson’ 
and Higgott’s coalition building principle in defining Middle Powers’ 
roles. He argued middle (or “system influencing”) powers “cannot hope 
to affect the system acting alone [but] can nevertheless exert significant 
impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or 
through universal or regional international organizations.” ‘Like-
Mindedness’, in this vein, is of a significance for Middle Powers in 
conducting their diplomacy. 
In a more institutional and practical manner, Tiberghien goes with 
arguments on the Middle Powers’ roles. He argues that middle powers 
can play three crucial roles. First, they can advance socialization and 
trust building among key major powers (by offering neutral forums). 
Socialization is a critical component in the formation of cross-national 
understandings around concepts of public goods and systemic risks 
among national elites (Johnston, 2008; Kent, 2002). Middle powers can 
enhance this process through the creation of track-two processes, 
foundations, symposiums, and information meetings (Tiberghien, 2013). 
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Second, propose and create innovative institutional designs. Middle 
powers have a key comparative advantage in developing new ideas, 
concepts, given the lower costs of experimentation in middle powers 
(Tiberghien, 2013). Third, initiate a small-scale experiments and host 
secretariat-type organizations, which in turn can shift boundaries. By 
playing first movers, they can generate new actors that will in turn 
accelerate the process of global governance by serving as laboratories 
for ideas and governance advocates (Tiberghien, 2013). 
Given this large number of constructive and alternative role of 
Middle Powers, it is encouraging to learn how Middle Powers exert 
their role in the region. Asia-Pacific, which is claimed to be “the center 
of the global importance”, serves a paramount example and case to 
further explore the role of Middle Powers to create the region more 
conducive and prosperous. 
C. Emerging Middle Power Role in the Asia-Pacific 
As Cooper et al. theorized, the increasing Middle Power activism gained 
its stronger hold ever since 1980s. In Asia-Pacific, the increasing role of 
Middle Powers is clear and sound. Australia and the Republic of Korea 
are among the prominent Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific which play 
a significant role in the international configurations. Through their wide-
ranging initiatives and proposals, Australia and the Republic of Korea 
give a significant contribution to the global dynamics which later serves 
as among the main rationales for this paper to discuss them. Their 




leverage for both countries to exert their constructive role in the 
international configurations. 
I. Australia and Its Advancement of the National Interests 
Oliver and Trood observed the unique characteristics of Australia as 
a foreign policy entity. Its position as part of the British Empire and 
its western identity (with the British Monarch still its head of state) 
is intertwined with its geographical situation in Asia.48 Amplifying 
global agenda for the sake of protecting and promoting the security 
and prosperity of Australia and Australian turned to be the pivotal 
value for Australia’s advancing the national interests (Foreign and 
Trade Policy, 2003). 
Combating terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, 
disarmament, climate change, human rights, humanitarian assistance 
and development are among the Australia’s global agenda. These 
multi-faceted agendas are channeled through regional as well as 
multilateral platforms, notably ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), G-20 and United Nations-led processes, which Canberra 
has assumed the rotational UNSC seat in 2013-2014. 
Along with their global agenda to advance their national 
interests, Australia also attaches great importance on protecting and 
promoting the security and prosperity of Australia and Australian. 
Bridging building and reconciling differences are then among 
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Australian ways to attain the aforementioned goal. With its 
“abundant” politically and economically influential endowment, 
Australia has played a facilitating role in the global dynamics. 
This facilitating activism has a long and deep-rooted history. 
Since 1945, Australia wrestled to put forward the agenda of “in-
between” countries in the San Francisco meeting. Herbert Evart, 
Labor Foreign Minister, first used the label of “middle power” in the 
1945 conference. 
More recently, Australian official emphasis on Middle Power 
opportunities, “Middle Power dreaming” for some, have been 
prominent in the Labor Party administrations of Bab Hawke (1983-
1991), Kevin Rudd (2007-2010, 2013) and Julia Gillard (2010-
2013). 49  Gareth Evans, Australia’s Foreign Ministry from 1988-
1996, translated “Middle Power diplomacy” as “the kind of foreign 
policy we have been crafting and implementing in recent years in 
which the characteristic method is coalition building with ‘like-
minded’ countries”.50 
Kevin Rudd, during his Prime Ministership and Foreign 
Ministership, coined “Creative Middle Power Diplomacy” as the 
Australia’s foreign policy prime mover. Under that concept, Rudd 
placed Australia “in bringing together major, regional and small 
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powers to shape and implement solutions through ‘Creative Middle 
Power Diplomacy”.51 
In the meantime, Julia Gillard spearheaded Australia’s 
longstanding commitment to active middle-power diplomacy. She 
put much weight on practical problem solving, effective 
implementation and building coalitions with others as the main 
prescription of the “Middle Power Diplomacy” concept. 
II. South Korea and Its Junggyun-guk 
The Inter Korean War that took place in early 1950s engendered 
massive destruction to South Korea in the following decade. A 
report mentioned that in 1960, South Korea’s GDP was equal to 
USD 79 only. This put the nation even lower than the Sub-Sharan 
countries in terms of its economic size. 
Thanks to industrialization policy of Park Chung-hee. Under his 
administration, Park Chung-hee propelled the massive ‘outward-
looking’ industrialization which later gives significant stimulus to 
the economic growth and development. Poor natural resources 
endowment, low savings rate and tiny domestic market pushed the 
Park administration to “bring” South Korea to international stage 
and market. Not least than four decades, South Korea has emerged 
from the ashes of the Korean War into to the member of OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) back in 2009. 
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The transformative economic growth has indeed imbued South 
Korean leaders to exert a more constructive role in the regional as 
well as global architecture. President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) 
coined the “Nordpolitik” in which the South effort to reach out to 
the traditional allies of the North Korea with hopes of creating peace 
and stability in the Peninsula. Later in the Kim Young Sam 
administration, South Korea envisioned “Segyehwa” agenda to 
advance its status in the global theater by embracing multi-faceted 
“political, cultural and social globalization” 52 . Kim Dae Jung’s 
“Sunshine Policy” envisaged the reconciling policy of the South 
Korean administration Viz-à-Viz the DPRK regime. 
The discourse about South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is 
taken up more seriously under the leadership of President Lee 
Myung-bak, as South Korea seeks to project its influence beyond the 
traditional security alliance into the region and the world.53 “New 
Initiative” and “Global Korea” are among the South Korea’s 
buzzwords asserting in the regional and global context during the 
period. In addition, Park Geun-hye administration further reinforced 
the Middle Powermanship of Korea. She envisioned South Korea’s 
Middle Powermanship through three levels, including “Diplomacy 
as Middle Powers”, “Diplomacy Towards Middle Powers” and 
“Diplomacy with Middle Powers”. 
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In general, Seoul’s approach of Junggyun-guk or Middle 
Powermanship is focusing more through foreign aid (Official 
Development Assistance/ODA) as well as global non-traditional 
challenges initiatives (Peace Keeping Operations/PKO). Embarking 
on a phenomenal economic growth, South Korea started to reverse 
its role from a recipient to a donor country since 1987. Korean Exim 
Bank reported ever since 1987 South Korean government has 
committed USD 11.8 billion of ODAs to 53 countries until 2015.54 
PKO serves a pivotal conduit for South Korea’s regional and 
global activism. South Korea began its involvement in UN 
peacekeeping with the 1993 operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) by 
sending a battalion 504 personnel known as the Evergreen Unit to 
repair roads and provide other types of humanitarian assistance 
(Groves, 2007: 44). At this time, South Korea has approximately 
1,440 service personnel deployed to over 30 countries and regions 
for UN peacekeeping, multinational peace operations, and security 
cooperation activities (ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2012: 
110). Over the past two decades, South Korea sent a large number of 
troops to three specific missions, inter alia UNIFIL in Lebanon; 
MINUSTAH in Haiti; and most recently UNMISS in South Sudan. 
D. Middle Power’s Role on the Denuclearization on the 
Korean Peninsula 
Although Middle Power Diplomacy gained stronger significance in the 
global dynamics, there are a few literatures on Middle Power’s role in 
                                                        




the Korean Peninsula, in particular on the denuclearization issue. With 
its bridge-building and impartial capability, the role of Middle Powers, 
especially in the Peninsula, is yet to be explored and capitalized in the 
literatures. Given this, the study attempts to fill and explore the 
academic gap on the mentioned issue. 
Among a few references, Simon MacQueen, a graduate of the 
Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 
offered his prominent views on the matter. Through his “Middle Powers 
and the Korean Peninsula: A New Security Paradigm”, MacQueen 
explored the (potential) role of middle powers in the Peninsula. 
MacQueen argues that Middle Powers are often in a suitable 
position for promoting and maintaining mechanism for security.  They 
enjoy robust relations with great powers whilst at the same time Middle 
Powers are very unlikely to confront smaller nations, either in military, 
economy or politics. In short, middle powers have a reputation for 
(relative) neutrality.55 
Historically, middle power conduct on the Korean Peninsula lent 
credence to the realist theory of middle powers as ‘followers’ (Cooper, 
Higgott, and Nossal, 1993). During the relatively stable period of 1997-
2002, it illustrated Middle Powers’ engagement with the DPRK, inter 
alia the (re-) establishment of diplomatic ties, increased aid and 
                                                        





humanitarian assistance and various other track two initiatives.56 Yet, as 
Ronald M. Behringer postulated Middle Powers will not harvest when 
their initiatives are at odds with the great power ambition. It is therefore 
clear when they returned dutifully in line order not to contradict US 
policy as the US castigated the North in 2002.57 
There is a discussion among scholars and outside observers on the 
need and feasibility of the middle power involvement in the Korean 
Peninsula. Some argue that the existing platform, the Six-Party process, 
would suffice. Some others believe that the involvement would further 
complicate the negotiations. However, as the Northeast Asian region 
espouses increasing geo-politic and –economic significance to the 
Middle Powers, the involvement of Middle Power deems to be of 
significance in maintaining stability for they have the necessary skills 
and knowledge of the area, as argued by MacQueen. 
He further goes with the argument that it is important for middle 
powers to remain current with Six-Party negotiations and take care not 
to counteract progress made by other governments. 58  By playing 
different roles and committing to distinct activities, including 
establishing a forum or regional ‘watchdog’ organization for transfer 
information, middle powers can minimize the possibility of clashing 
with the interests of great powers (MacQueen, 2008). MacQueen later 
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emphasizes that middle powers can play a strategic role in the low-key 
sectors, such as environmental, economic, social and educational, rather 
than the denuclearization per se.  
On the other hand, the prominent asset that the Middle Powers could 
assert in the Korean Peninsula (and Six-Party Talks) issue is 
‘impartiality’ as Bercovitch suggested. Impartiality is among the major 
missing links in the issue despite being an important yet qualifiable 
element for successful mediation. The tendency of each member to 
retain separate, widely different perceptions and agendas is a perennial 
difficulty associated with tightly-knit, high-tension regions along with 
historical and strategic stakes of outcome (Macqueen, 2008). 
Due to the intense nature and lengthy duration of great power rivalry 
on the Peninsula during the Cold War, middle power conduct in the 
region was highly constrained (MacQueen, 2008). It is, thus, not 
surprising that they have shown caution and reluctance to become 
actively involved-in fact the major powers have on occasion been 
suspicious of attempts by outside parties to suggest alternative 
arrangements to the status quo.59 In addition, it seems that middle power 
engagement in the Peninsula lacks of coordination, Some commentators 
maintain that one specific country should act as leader, harmonizing the 
initiative (Robertson, 2007). 
Having said this, the middle power’s role in the Peninsula, in 
accordance to MacQueen’s principle, shall compliment and supplement 
existing bilateral efforts in the region instead of replacing them. Dewitt, 
                                                        




writing in 1997, further reiterates that middle powers will not act as 
panaceas and solve all of the Peninsula’s problems rather as alternative 























I. Indonesia and Its Non-Alignment and Activism 
Gaining independence after the World War II, Indonesia struggled to be 
recognized as an independent state on the global chessboard. Cold War 
rivalry serves a substantial challenge for Indonesia to navigate in the global 
theater. The so-called “Capitalist” and “Communist” bloc vied for global 
influence in a very delicate international configuration. As a “new kid in the 
bloc”, Indonesia shall opt for a policy which could bring up peace and 
prosperity to their people, in particular, and the world, at large. 
“Free” as in Non-Alignment and “Active” are later opted for the 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy adages. As a newly-independent state, Indonesia 
requires a peaceful and friendly dynamics to serve a conducive conduit to 
grow. Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta translated the 
adages in his “Rowing between the Two Reefs”. Hatta stressed his thought 
on the importance of maintaining Indonesia’s “neutrality” as well as 
“impartiality”. Her independent policy keeps her from enmity with either 
party, preserves her from the damage to her own interests that would follow 
from taking sides, and permits her to be friends with all nations on a basis of 
mutual respect.60 
                                                        




Along this line, in 1950s, Indonesia initiated the establishment of the 
Asia-Africa movement as well as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Amidst the global and omnipresent rivalry between the two blocs, Indonesia, 
and the other Third-World countries, met in Bandung to spearhead the spirit 
of freedom and independence. They also echoed anti-colonialism which was 
prevalent in that period. This initiative serves a huge stepping stone for 
Indonesia to play a more constructive role in the global theaters in the years 
to come.  
The Establishment of Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) back in 1967 attested another stepping stone for Indonesia’s 
activism foreign policy. Together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand, Indonesia spearheaded the regional grouping, which later 
expanded to Brunei, Viet Nam, Cambodia,  Laos and Myanmar, to embrace 
the political and economic dynamics in the region and beyond. As among 
the founding countries, Indonesia recognizes ASEAN as a strategic platform 
to navigate their foreign policy. ASEAN, in turn, became a substantial 
element of Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
The significance of ASEAN on Indonesia’s foreign policy is translated 
into the “First Concentric Circle” of Indonesia. The Concentric Circle is a 
foreign policy concept which underlines the level of strategic importance 
for Indonesia to exert its role in accordance to the geographic proximity as 
well as geo-strategic and geo-economic modality (which appears as Figure 
1 below). As the first Concentric Circle, ASEAN plays an important role for 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. In terms of geographical proximity, ASEAN is 




home to more than 600 million population which entails a promising market 
for Indonesian products. In terms of economic size, ASEAN ranks as the 7th 
largest GDP (current prices) in 2013.61  
 
Source: http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFP.aspx?P=Regional&l=en 
Figure 1 Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Concentric Circle 
In addition, ASEAN + 3 envisaged another important layer for 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. 10 ASEAN member states plus 3 ASEAN 
Strategic Partners, notably China, Japan and Republic of Korea, serve a 
pivotal ground for Indonesia to exert their role. China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea are the strategic partners of Indonesia in multi-array of 
areas of cooperation, including but not limited to politics, economy and 
socio-culture. Last but not least, Indonesia attach and keep renewing great 













importance on the relations with the US and EU as well as other like-
minded countries. They are mutual partners of Indonesia in streamlining the 
regional as well as global interests in the international arena. 
III. Evolving Nature of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
Since its independence back in 1940s, Indonesia defines its foreign policy 
on the framework of “Free” as in “Non-Alignment” and “Active/Activism”. 
This framework remains the “core values” of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
from time to time despite different conducts by different administrations. 
In the Soekarno administration, Indonesia put greater emphasis on 
drawing and garnering political support from the global theater. As a newly 
independent country, Indonesia requires political recognition as well as 
acknowledgment.  Foreign policy was, therefore, navigated to attain the 
mentioned goal. The 1955 Non-Aligned Movement and Asian-African 
Conference was among the catalysts of the political agenda. 
Soeharto, the following administration, took full benefit of the political 
foundation built by Soekarno. In his governance, he spearheaded 
“development” diplomacy. He established cooperation with key donor 
countries to help build Indonesia’s economy. In the post-Soeharto era (so-
called “Reformasi” era), notably Habibie’, Abdurrahman Wahid’ (Gusdur) 
and Megawati’s era, Indonesia embraced a newly-growing democracy. 
During the “transition period”, it navigated its foreign policy to rejuvenate 
its past image as well as propelled economic cooperation. 
Under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono term, Indonesia elevated its 




successfully put Indonesia to a higher and greater level in the global theater 
and configuration. Playing as well as exerting a constructive role in the 
global agenda setting through multilateral platform, Indonesia gained wider 
recognition as an emerging regional power. “Thousand Friends, Zero 
Enemies” and “Navigating in the Turbulent Ocean” are Yudhoyono’s 
Foreign Policy adages and concepts. 
Coming from a business sector background, the current President Joko 
“Jokowi” Widodo took an “aggressive” economic foreign policy. Jakarta 
recalibrated its foreign policy approach with its counterparts to a “people-
centred priorities”. Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum policy, recognised as 
his signature foreign policy, provides a good example of Jakarta’s new 
approach. The policy is strategically designed to address the massive 
infrastructure development required to unlock Indonesia’s domestic 
economic integration and drive growth. As such, Jokowi perceives the 
strengthening of bilateral, rather than multilateral, relationships as the most 
efficient policy for attracting foreign investment to meet the USD $6 
billion required to develop Indonesia’s port infrastructure.62 
III. Promising Modalities for Middle Powermanship 
As the biggest archipelagic state on earth with over 17,000 islands, 
Indonesia, according to the World Factbook, is the world's 15th-largest 
country in terms of land area and world's 7th-largest country in terms of 
combined sea and land area.63 Its robust economy has put Indonesia as one 
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of the world’s best performing and most consistent ones. Its average growth 
rate since 2001 is 5.4 percent, despite the global financial crisis, making it 
jump from being the world’s 27th largest economy in 2000 (nominal GDP) 
to the 16th largest today.64 
The 2016 Global Investment Trends Monitor report, issued by the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Oct. 6, puts 
Indonesia in ninth position on its list of top prospective host countries for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from 2016 to 2018, up from the 14th 
position in 2014.65 It is also forecast to take the 7th rank by 2030 and the 
4th largest in 2040 by McKinsey Global Institute and Citibank respectively. 
The number of middle-class and affluent consumers, possessing at least Rp 
50 million (US$3,825) in household assets, is set to increase to 141 million 
people by 2020, up from 88 million in 2014, according to a Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) survey.66 
The “non-aligned and active” foreign policy reiterates Indonesia’s 
“Middle Powermanship”, including Viz-à-Viz the major powers. Santo 
Darmosumarto, an Indonesian diplomat, argues looking at Indonesia’s 
positions and policies regarding different issues preoccupying the region, 
Indonesia has legitimate reasons to call itself the regional, and probably also 
international, community’s “key balancer, mediator, and mobilizer” and be 
accepted by both the “developing and developed world, the North and South, 
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and Muslim and non-Muslim-majority countries. 67  In the meantime, 
Indonesia attached great importance on the multilateral institution/processes, 
especially ASEAN and other ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. The South 
China Sea disputes, for example, gives vivid idea on how Indonesia, by 
echoing exemplary multilateral approach, recognizes the significance of the 
platform which in turn put Indonesia as a ‘good global citizen’. 
IV. Indonesia’s Mediating Role Experiences 
Indonesia’s active and independent foreign policy statute further shapes its 
navigating role in the global architecture. Active in giving significant 
contribution to the global peace and stability and independent in non-
aligning to any of the global powers’ agenda have put Indonesia in a better 
leverage. Neutrality and sincerity turned to be the political commodity that 
Indonesia exerts to the international dynamics. 
Mediation, in this context, is therefore not a far-distant agenda from 
Indonesia’s foreign relations network. It has a deep root in Indonesia’s 
history and significant prevalence to Indonesia’s today. Back in 1978 at a 
time when Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja chaired 
the ASEAN Standing Committee, Indonesia displayed its leading activism 
in the so-called the ‘Third Indochina War’ (1978-1991). Taking full benefit 
of the chairmanship, Minister Mochtar, speaking for the ASEAN, deplored 
the Vietnamese invasion to Cambodia and urged as well as called for the 
Vietnamese troops’ withdrawal from Cambodia. 
                                                        





Along this vein, Indonesia spearheaded the other ASEAN member states 
to place the dispute on the UN Security Council agenda. Although there is a 
geo-politic divergence with Bangkok on the issue of ASEAN Centrality 
towards Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Khmer self-
determination, Jakarta actively sought to engage the Khmers and 
Vietnamese and their External Sponsors in search for a settlement that 
would recognize legitimate interests on all sides.68 From 1982 to the signing 
of the Final Act of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia on 23 
October 1991, Indonesia played a central role in peace negotiations under 
both Mochtar and his successor, Ali Alatas. 
Pursuing bilateral political communication with Hanoi while 
maintaining its commitment to the ASEAN formula or so-called “Dual-
Track” diplomacy deem to be the Jakarta’s main formula in the dispute. It 
later cemented the acknowledgement of Indonesia’s official ‘interlocutor’ 
role with Vietnam by ASEAN in 1986. In July 1987, the concerned parties 
witnessed a breakthrough of the conflict. Minister Mochtar and Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach of Vietnam welcomed the Indonesia’s initiative 
to conduct an informal meeting between the Khmer parties, to which other 
concerned countries would also be invited. 
This so-called "cocktail party" formula in turn led to the first Jakarta 
Informal Meeting (JIM I) in July 1988, “at which the issue of the 
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia--the external question--
was decoupled from the Khmer "civil war"--the internal question.” 69  A 
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change of administration in Thailand which had exceptionally shifted the 
Bangkok’s policy Vizà-Viz the negotiated settlement served the ground for 
the Second Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM II) in February 1989. Chaired by 
Alatas, the JIM II deliberated on the “international control mechanism” for 
Cambodia which was accepted by Hanoi. It, therefore, fostered the efforts 
which in turn led to the July 1990 Paris International Conference on 
Cambodia co-chaired by Indonesia and France. 
The conference, however, did not deliver significant progress. But, by 
then international events influencing great power relations had outpaced 
ASEAN's and Indonesia's ability to coordinate. 70  The five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council--working through Paris International 
Conference on Cambodia channels--took up the challenge of negotiating a 
peace settlement in Cambodia and, with Indonesia assuming a burdensome 
diplomatic role, fashioned a peace agreement that led to the deployment of 
forces of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). 71  
Jakarta’s sense of achievement and pride in its role in delivering peace to 
Indochina was reflected in among others the South China Sea claims, which 
not only took the initiative to multilateralize the issue but also reconcile the 
divergences. 
South China Sea disputes is another Indonesia’s testing ground. This 
conflict has been raising its tension since the last four decades. Involving 
both island and maritime claims among six parties in the region, namely 
Brunei Darussalam, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, the South China Sea has 






become a difficult and complicated area in Asia’s regional security. China 
seems to be trying to monopolize overall control of the whole area of the 
South China Sea, and its claim is widely referred as the nine-dash line, of 
which interpretation deviate substantially from long-established 
international conducts and protocols such as UNCLOS (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea). 
South China Sea is rich in oil and gas reserves. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, hydrocarbon reserves in the South 
China Sea amount to 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas. The Sea canvassed a strategic location where it has a large 
number of vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) connecting Malacca 
Strait/Singapore and Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel, which have traditionally 
been the lifelines of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, as well as the 
United States. 
Despite a non-claimant state, Indonesia plays a constructive role in the 
dispute. The 45th ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Phnom Penh back 
in 2012 best illustrates its invaluable mediating role of Indonesia in the 
dynamics. For the first time in the ASEAN history, it had failed to reach a 
consensus on (how to put reference on South China Sea dispute in) a joint 
communiqué. Indonesia, later, took initiative to conduct ‘Shuttle Diplomacy” 
to the capitals of the Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore and Viet Nam with 
the purpose to converge the divergence among the parties concerned. 
During the 72-hour Shuttle Diplomacy marathon, Indonesia’s former 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa put forward the Six Points of Principles. 




the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and follow 
the guidelines for its implementation; to work toward an early adoption of a 
Code of Conduct meant to strengthen the 2002 Declaration; to exercise self-
restraint and avoid threatening or using force; and to uphold the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in keeping with universally recognized principles of 
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).72 Eventually, the divergence managed to be reconciled. 
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers later shared collective aspiration on the 
issue of the South China Sea. 
V. Indonesia and the Korean Peninsula Dynamics  
The peace and stability in the Peninsula is of utmost importance for 
countries in the world, including Indonesia. In the economic facet, there are, 
not the least, three Indonesia’s major trading partners. Japan, China and the 
Republic of Korea are the first, second and sixth Indonesia’s biggest trading 
partner in 2014, consecutively.73 In addition, the Peninsula stakeholders, 
notably the US, Japan, the ROK, China and Russia, contribute over USD 
2,250 million worth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Indonesia in the 
first quarter of the year 2016, which is equivalent to 32% of total FDI to 
Indonesia. 74  As FDI plays an important role on Indonesia’s economy 
structure, which shares over 65% of the total investment ratio of the first 
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quarter of 2016, 75  it is therefore of Indonesia’s aspiration to pursue 
perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula. 
Korean Peninsula has been ‘integral part’ of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
since its early age. During President Soekarno’s administration, the first 
Indonesia’s president, Indonesia had a very strong relations with the DPRK. 
Back in 1964, Soekarno paid a state visit to Pyongyang. And in the 
following year, Premier Kim Il Sung paid a return visit to Indonesia. 
In this context, idiosyncrasy plays a crucial role in the Indonesia – 
DPRK relations. Soekarno and Kim-Il Sung set a solid ground for both 
countries to further develop their relations. The collective spirit of Asian 
and African people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism 
deemed to be of the main engine in navigating the cooperation at that time. 
Soekarno ‘factor’ serves an important modality for Indonesia to garner 
the DPRK’s trust in playing a mediating role in the Peninsula dynamics. 
From 2002 to 2011, it is reported that there are three high-level Indonesian 
visits to Pyongyang. In 2002, the fifth Indonesia’s President Megawati 
Soekarno Putri, the daughter of Soekarno, paid a state visit to Pyongyang 
and had a tête–à–tête meeting with Kim Jong-Il. A number of media sources 
reported that Megawati was on the mission of conveying President Kim Dae 
Jung of South Korea as well as the US government’s message to the North 
Korean government regarding the nuclear issue. 
                                                        





In addition, in the year 2005 and 2011, respectively, the former 
President Megawati paid another visit to Pyongyang with the similar 
purpose of delivering message on Peninsula reunification and 
denuclearization as well as Indonesia’s mediating proposal to the Kim Jong-
Il’s regime. 
Indonesia also exerted its mediating role through multilateral platform. 
During 2003-2008, Indonesia sent a special envoy to the Six-Party Talks. 
Ambassador Nana Sutresna, former Indonesian Permanent Representative 
to the UN in New York for the period of 1988-1992 and former Indonesian 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom of 1999-2002, following the 
instructions of President Megawati as well as former Indonesian President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, acted as an ‘acknowledged interlocutor’ 
between the DPRK and the other five-party members. His mission was to, 
among others, bridge the diverging interests between the DPRK and the 
other five members.76 In this spirit, he took shuttle diplomacy to all Six-
Party member countries and garnered strategic messages to help expedite 
the negotiation rounds. 
The establishment of ASEAN Committee in Pyongyang (ACP) is 
another mediating initiative of Indonesia in regards to the Peninsula 
dynamics. Comprising of five ASEAN member states’ missions in 
Pyongyang, namely Indonesia’, Cambodia’, Lao PDR’, Malaysia’ and Viet 
Nam’s, ACP is an informal grouping/dialogue among the Head of Missions 
(Ambassadors). Apart from being an internal dialogue platform among 
ASEAN Head of Missions on common issues and challenges, ACP also 
                                                        




serves a bi-folded feature. In one hand, it plays a crucial role as a trust-
building platform with the DPRK side. It offers a platform for ASEAN 
Head of Missions to exchange views with the DPRK government officials, 
although the outcomes or feedbacks are limited77. On the other hand, it also 
offers first-hand information for the outside actors since one of the ACP’s 
activities is to conduct seminar or workshop on wide-ranging issues by 
inviting international body officials, including that of Food and Agricultural 
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ANALYSIS: ASSERTING INDONESIA’S 
ROLE TO RESUME THE SIX-PARTY 
TALKS 
I. From Asymmetry to Go-Between 
Impartiality has been a long-standing issue in the DPRK’s denuclearization 
resolution. Each and every party was “entangled” with their vested interests 
on the table. China, for instance, as a “bridge builder” between the DPRK 
and the US-led faction, thrived to reach their own compromise in 
negotiating with both sides. While conveying the CVID message to 
Pyongyang, Beijing, at the same time, attempted to manage the peace and 
stability intact in the Peninsula with the purpose of providing an avenue for 
their peaceful rise. As the compromise was yet to be reached, it later led to 
the (political) stalemate which put the regional and international peace and 
stability at stake. 
Asserting neutral bridge builder, or so-called the Third-Party, to the 
Talks, against this, seems to be promising in unlocking the impasse. This 
Third-Party, first of all, is benefited with their “impartiality”, which Oran R. 
Young defined as “a situation in which the third party favors neither side to 
a crisis”78, in helping navigate the negotiations. They are relatively impartial 
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towards any of the party in the negotiations. It later puts them in a better 
leverage to gain the trust. They, in addition, hardly put their own agenda 
forward to the negotiation. By engaging the Third-Party, they could help 
“rejuvenate” the relevant stakeholders in further exploring alternative and 
constructive solutions. 
As impartiality is among the utmost elements of the Third-Party in 
helping pursue constructive solutions to the Talks, Middle Power is 
therefore a potential candidate in undertaking the mandate. Jacob 
Bercovitch, a widely-regarded-leading expert on international mediation, 
theorized that Middle Powers are of better leverage with their impartiality. 
They enjoy robust relations with great powers whilst at the same time 
Middle Powers are very unlikely to confront smaller nations, either in 
military, economy or politics. They, in addition, have a key comparative 
advantage in developing new ideas and concepts (Tiberghien, 2013). 
II. Four-Pronged Approach to Help Resuscitate the 
Stalemate  
Barry M. Rubin, professor on international relations, has noted that 
negotiations stalemate offers an ample opportunity to the assertion of a 
Third-Party. As the disputants are unable to reconcile the differences, “they 
are sufficiently cooperative that they are willing to invite or accept (with the 
strong emphasis added) the intrusion of one or more external (third) parties 
who may be able to break the conflictual stalemate.79 Touval and Zartman 
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further asserted that “third-party intervention is most likely to be successful 
when the parties have encountered what they call a ‘hurting stalemate’— a 
situation in which the parties feel uncomfortable and where events may be 
on the threshold of worsening, perhaps through an escalation of the conflict 
or getting better through the resolution of the conflict.” 80  This maybe 
particularly true if the parties both want to bring an end to their conflict but 
seek face-saving ways to do so, to prevent from damaging their image as 
negotiators. 
However, as Hopmann argues, “the two camps may not necessarily 
share the desire to accept mediation with equal enthusiasm.”81 Parties in 
possession are less receptive of third-party efforts than are parties who feel 
that such efforts are likely to result in a solution or adjustment more 
favorable to them than the continuation of the status quo”82 
Given this, Indonesia, apart from waiting for the request, could also 
approach the Six-Party Talks members to offer the Third-Party good 
offices for the impasse. Its long-standing mediating experience in 
pursuing resolutions in international conflicts is of utmost significance for 
Indonesia to exert its role in the Peninsula. In addition, its consistent 
impartial role in the Peninsula serves best modality to (re-)gain the trust, 
support as well as legitimacy from the concerned stakeholders. After 
having the trust and legitimacy, Indonesia suffices to exert its P. Terrence 
Hopmann’s roles of Third-Party in the international disputes, notably (i) 
process facilitator; (ii) facilitator of the communication, compromise and 
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convergence; (iii) facilitator of cognitive change; (iv) formulator; and (v) 
manipulator83. 
However, the paper puts more weights on the first four roles of the 
Hopmann’s concept. The fifth Manipulator role, as Hopmann argued, 
works best only for powerful as well as partisan mediators. It is clear to 
argue that Indonesia does not fall under strong power but Middle Power 
group. In addition, as among the most potential candidate of the Third-
Party on the Six-Party Talks, Indonesia is relatively impartial in asserting 
its role. Therefore, the fifth role of Hopmann’s Third-Party concept does 
not fit to be applied on the paper.in the Six-Party Talks to help explore 
positive-sum solutions for the parties concerned. 
A. Process Facilitator 
Hopmann defines “Process Facilitator” as a party who “tries to create 
conditions that are conducive to reaching agreement (good offices)”.84 
This Facilitator, first, puts significant weight on how to make the 
disputants feel convenient in undertaking their negotiations.  Offering 
avenue (facilities) for negotiations is therefore among their notable 
contributions to the negotiation. 
Such “Process Facilitating” role is deeply rooted in the Indonesia’s 
go-between role. Dating back to the Jakarta Informal Meeting in 1970s, 
Indonesia offered Jakarta to the concerned parties to conduct the 
negotiations. As the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, in that context, 
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envisioned “neutrality” to all stakeholders. Under such a high-tense 
circumstance, neutrality is of utmost importance in ensuring the 
continuing dialogue to find positive-sum solutions. 
In the Six-Party Talks context, Indonesia could propose Aceh (a city 
in Sumatra, western part of Indonesia) to be the “Facilitating” avenue. 
After struggling to fight against its long-standing and multi-faceted 
insurgency for three decades, Aceh has transformed to be a peaceful, 
vibrant and promising city through an extensive-but-worthwhile Peace 
Agreement between the government and the rebel group. Such 
association would, to some extent, best help build confidence and 
optimism among the parties concerned that positive-sum resolution is 
not unfeasible. 
Secondly, Process Facilitator, as argued by Hopmann, may also help 
further improve communications among the disputants. They may listen 
to the parties and help them identify the space for bargaining—
negotiable and non-negotiable undertakings. At a time when there is no 
bargaining space, the Process Facilitator will help create the 
“equilibrium” point, including “possible linkages and tradeoffs between 
non-negotiable issues that, when combined, may produce negotiable 
packages of issues”.85 In addition, they also give contribution to the 
agenda setting. Identifying the easiest, which will put as the first agenda 
item, to the toughest issues, leaving to the last and final deliberation, to 
be put forward on the table is part of their responsibility, to this end. 





Given the intricate and complex nature of the Six-Party Talks, 
Indonesia may garner insights and stakes from each and every party 
which later help them identify the bargaining space as well as (non-) 
negotiable issues to move the Talks. As shown in vast body of literature, 
Comprehensive, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) is 
the most un-negotiated issue on the Talks. For the DPRK, nuclear is not 
solely a weapon but mostly an ideology. While for the US (and its 
allies), this issue is equally principle to “Jus Cogens”86. The US has 
taken upon itself the task of defending the NPT and has regarded it as an 
issue of principle that should not be compromised in a process of mutual 
concession-making (Buszyinski, 2013). 
In the meantime, accountability and mutual respect deem to be the 
most tangible and earliest-harvest agenda item for the parties to put on 
the table. There has been a wide concern on the DPRK’s intention to 
make use of the (foreign) aid to further develop the nuclear program 
despite its original humanitarian function. Its “hermit” governance 
triggers wide suspicion on the foreign aid misconduct. On the other 
hand, the US faction lacked trust on the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un 
regime. Against this, it is feasible for Indonesia to convey to both parties 
to exercise accountability as well as respect the other’s political regime 
with a view to building confidence and trust between both sides which 
in turn may help the parties to make a progress of the Talks. 
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B. Facilitator of the Communication, Compromise and 
Convergence 
Advocating mutual and simultaneous flexibility is a key role of this 
Facilitator of the Communication, Compromise and Convergence of 
Hopmann. Firstly and most importantly, they seek the principle and 
fundamental interests of each and every party. They may also identify 
the limit to the acceptable concession. Afterwards, it is of the 
Facilitator’s “responsibility” to provide channels for the parties to 
exchange their basic information which serves among fundamental 
foundations for a successful negotiation. 
Once communications lines have been opened, the next obstacle 
may often be the mutual fear of making initial concessions, which will 
likely be perceived by others as a sign of weaknesses.87 To tackle this, 
the Facilitator may initiate a “private-reciprocated agreement” which 
ensures a two-way or simultaneous concession from each party which 
then could lead them to a tit-for-tat process towards convergence. “They 
may try to convey concessions by one party to the other as if they were 
proposals of the mediator rather than concessions extracted from the 
opponent.”88 By so doing, none of the party would lose their “face” in 
the negotiation. Also, it may make the proposals be less “challenged” by 
the other party. 
The role of the US Assistant Secretary of State for East and Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill on the landmark 2005 Joint 
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Agreement serves as the best example for this facilitating role. Unlike 
the neo-conservatives, he supported the South’s offer to provide 
electricity to the North and agreed to place the issue of the Light Water 
Reactors (LWRs) on the agenda.89 It, in many ways, implied that the US 
recognized the DPRK nuclear program, despite a peaceful one, which, 
thus far, had been the toughest issue to be settled. That later gives a 
significant confidence to the DPRK to reciprocate the “flexibility”, 
notably dismantling their nuclear program. 
Similar role may also be assumed by Indonesia. Having identified 
the most sensitive issues, Indonesia may establish mutual confidence to 
craft tit-for-tat concessions. Widely recognized as the impartial and 
neutral facilitator, Indonesia is of better leverage to convince the parties 
on the proposals as well as avoid each party losing their face in the 
negotiation. Joint Commission and Bilateral Meetings may offer an 
“amicable” avenue for Indonesia to undertake this facilitating role. By 
“disguising” the other parties’ concession under a wide and general 
agenda item, including “Regional Security Issues” 90 , Indonesia may 
garner the opponent’s stance which in turn could lead to a mutually 
beneficial concession. 
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C. Facilitator of Cognitive Change 
This facilitating role seems opposite of the previous one. Rather than 
trying to persuade the parties to change their positions along an issue 
dimension, in this case the mediator tries to induce the parties to change 
their preferences themselves through seeing the problem in a new 
light.91 Change of paradigm, in this context, is pivotal in leading to 
“conciliation”, “a process in which the mediators tries to modify the 
parties image of each other and to influence them to make concessions 
by clarifying to each his opponent’s views and the bargaining situation 
that both face”92. To do this, it is important to understand each other’s 
policy deeply or as Hopmann calls “to get into the shoes of other 
person”. 
Such “image constructing” role entails a long-termed process. To 
better understand each other’s policy, Indonesia necessitates conduct 
unrelenting and continuous discussion and other trust-building measures 
with all the parties. 93  By so doing, Indonesia may come up with 
problem-solving resolutions to the parties concerned. Second-track or 
informal channel deems to be the most feasible and rationale way of 
engaging the other parties in a way to de-construct the stereotype. 
Informal shuttle diplomacy or other bilateral platforms may work to this 
end. Also, informal regional and multilateral platforms, such as the 
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Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)-like, is worth 
encouraging with a purpose to mainstream the image deconstruction to 
have a better and more constructive paradigm in reaching the problem-
solving situation as well as to reduce misunderstandings. 
D. Formulator 
As implied on its name, Formulator brings new hope and new solutions 
to the negotiation stalemate. The mediator may function by encouraging 
the parties to brainstorm. 94  After listening to the parties’ stake, the 
Formulator takes the lead to propose mutually beneficial and problem-
solving solutions which was yet previously considered by either party. 
Given this, brainstorming seems to be a major missing link in the Six-
Party Talks rounds. Each and every party persists with their un-
negotiable interests and goals. US-led faction persevers with their CVID 
agenda. Beijing and Moscow, on the other hand, staunchly uphold on to 
the peace and stability prescription. Last but not least, Kim Jong-un and 
its previous administrations recognize nuclearization as their ideology 
and constitutional mandate. 
Pruitt and Rin later proposed a roadmap that includes general to 
specific issues to resolve the stalemate. Recalling the 2005 Joint 
Agreement, there were no provisions for timing and scheduling. Neither 
did they stipulate when the disarmament would begin (Buszynski, 2013). 
Despite its complex and complicated issue, however, brainstorming on 
denuclearization or long-termed solution timetable or roadmap seems to 
                                                        




be worth exploring by Indonesia should they assume the Formulator on 
























Perpetual peace and stability in the Peninsula remains a collective aspiration. 
The DPRK denuclearization poses a substantial and ubiquitous challenge to the 
region and beyond. A number of platforms have been undertaken to address this 
very issue. However, the long-awaited outcome remains elusive. 
The Six-Party Talks, which is still regarded as the most plausible platform 
to address the DPRK issue by large number of scholars and policy makers, is 
yet to find converging interests on pursuing for permanent peaceful solutions in 
the Peninsula. As this paper argues, differences in interests and agendas deem 
to be the main impediment in fostering the resolutions. Each and every party, as 
theory called “Actor’s Approach”, staunchly holds on to their respective agenda 
which in turn leads to the political stalemate where compromise is yet to be 
reached. 
As different factions pursue different interests, impartiality is, therefore, a 
key to help reconcile the divergence. However, impartiality could not be found 
in any members of the Talks as they clearly pursue their own interests on the 
platform. The emergence of Middle Power role in the regional as well as global 
architecture deems a promising alternative (Third-Party) in addressing the 
loophole. Its impartiality as well as neutrality in the conflicts turns to be their 
major modality in garnering political support as well as legitimacy to help 
reconcile the difference. 
62 
Indonesia, with its non-alignment and activism, starkly came up as the most 
potential candidate in helping explore positive-sum solutions on the Six-Party 
Talks. Indonesia remains committed to maintain its neutrality and impartiality 
in their foreign policy activism. Its long-standing mediating and Third-Party 
role in a number of international conflicts deem to be a valid argument in 
orchestrating Indonesia’s as the most fitted candidate in helping explore 
peaceful resolution on the Six-Party Talks through its go-between role. 
P. Terrence Hopmann’s articulated four-pronged Third-Party approach to
help Indonesia explore positive-sum solutions in the Six-Party Talks. Through 
being a process facilitator; facilitator of the communication, compromise and 
convergence; facilitator of cognitive change; and formulator, Indonesia is 
expected to be able to help concerned parties explore solutions to resume the 
Six-Party Talks. However, resolving disputes requires perseverance, persistence 
and flexibility. It is a long-termed process. Unless, there were an Aladdin’s 
lamp which could have made the perpetual peace and stability in peninsula 
happened soon. 
This research is one among a few references on the role of Middle Powers 
in the Korean Peninsula. Despite some flaws and limitations, the paper is 
expected to give significant contribution and foundation to the future researches 
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